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Abstract 
 
The Eurozone needs a bank resolution regime that can work across seventeen independent 
nations of diverse sizes with varying levels of financial development, limited fiscal co-
responsibility, and with systemic instability induced by quick and low-cost deposit transfers 
across borders. We advocate a Coasean approach to bank resolution policy in the Eurozone, 
which emphasises clear and consistent contracts and makes explicit the public ownership of 
the externality costs of bank distress. A variety of resolution mechanisms are compared 
including bank debt holder bail-in, prompt corrective action, and contingent convertible 
bonds. We argue that the “dilute-in” of bank debt holders via contingent convertibility 
provides a clearer and simpler Coasean bargain for the Eurozone than the more conventional 
alternatives of debt holder bail-in or prompt corrective action.  
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1. Introduction 
This policy note considers various bank resolution mechanisms and evaluates them for use in 
the Eurozone. It is widely accepted that the Eurozone needs a fundamental restructuring of its 
bank resolution regime. The concurrent discussion of bank resolution changes in the USA 
provides the basis for most of the recent research literature. However, the flaws in the bank 
resolution regime in the Eurozone, and the range of feasible choices for improvement, differ 
sharply from those in the USA. The Eurozone’s political-economic structure is quite 
different; it consists of seventeen independent nations with separate legal systems, varying 
levels of financial development, and limited fiscal co-responsibility. Cross-border credit 
flows and contagion make a regionally-controlled policy preferable, while political 
legitimacy is strongest at the national level. These monetary, political and regulatory features 
must be accommodated in bank resolution policy for the Eurozone.  
Our analysis of bank resolution policy is founded on Coase’s approach to optimal contracting 
in the presence of public externalities. Bank distress causes large public costs and, under 
Coase’s analysis, the inefficiency associated with externalities can be eliminated by assigning 
clear property rights to the production of the externality. We argue that due to public-cost 
externalities the contingent right to contribute to bank distress should not be granted in any 
bank liability claim; the Eurozone-wide banking authority owns the right to prevent bank 
distress; where necessary this right should be allowed to override existing bank liability 
contracts in explicit, contingent circumstances. The bank resolution regime in the Eurozone 
should have this Coase-type contingent-ownership-right clearly expressed and simple to 
exercise.   
We evaluate various bank resolution mechanisms from our Coasean perspective. We examine 
the strengths and weaknesses of bail-outs and bail-ins as resolution strategies for the 
Eurozone. We show that the successful US system of prompt corrective action (PCA) against 
weak commercial banks conforms well to our Coasean approach. However, we argue that 
PCA might not work reliably in the Eurozone due to the difficulties with fast and aggressive 
regulatory takeover of banks in a multinational system. We then consider contingent 
convertible bank debt. Contingent convertibility uses a policy of “dilute-in” rather than bail-
in of bank liability claimants. It is faster and is less legally fraught than bail-in, and can be 
instigated in the early stages of financial distress rather than in the final (bankruptcy) stage. It 
does not eliminate the need for a bankruptcy process, but lessens the reliance upon it. 
Contingent convertibility has the early intervention feature of PCA without its contractual 
and legal difficulties, which are particularly severe in a Eurozone context. Importantly from 
our perspective, contingent convertibility makes manifest the right of the central regulatory 
authority to block event-contingent bank liability claims which may contribute to bank 
distress and associated public costs. 
Section 2 introduces our Coasean perspective on bank resolution policy. Section 3 evaluates 
bail-outs and bail-ins as resolution mechanisms for the Eurozone. Section 4 considers the 
alternative of prompt corrective action against weak banks. Section 5 discusses contingent 
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convertibility of bank liabilities and outlines a proposal for extensive, flexible-form 
contingent convertibility of Eurozone bank liabilities. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Bank Distress and Government Intervention: A Coasean Perspective 
In most European countries, corporate bankruptcy is a slow and complex legal and 
managerial transfer of ownership and control over assets and liabilities. Particularly for 
banks, this protracted process generates large negative shocks to asset value. The preceding 
period of financial distress, when bank management, claimants and customers foresee 
possible bankruptcy, is also value-destroying. Crucially, bank distress and bankruptcy 
generate economy-wide externality costs. If all distress and bankruptcy costs were privately 
borne by the bank’s direct claimants, there would be no public policy issue; banks and direct 
claimants could pre-negotiate the private-best solution, e.g., very low debt levels. In the case 
of banks, distress-and-bankruptcy-associated costs are spread widely across the regional or 
national economy. Banks are incentivized to hold high levels of debt, knowing that the 
benefits accrue to their direct claimants and the potential costs are spread publicly. Also, for 
very large banks, in the event of distress the public authorities are ex-post rationally disposed 
to provide taxpayer-funded support to the bank.  
As shown by Coase (1960), inefficiencies generated by public externalities can be mitigated 
or (under restrictive conditions) entirely eliminated by assigning the right to control the 
externality explicitly to agents. This allows all concerned parties to contract efficiently 
among themselves, and thereby find a first-best solution to production and trade with 
externalities; see Varian (1994). Figure 1 provides a descriptive treatment of our Coasean 
perspective on bank distress and the associated public externalities. In Step 1, a bank issues 
liabilities, that is, contracts to pay cash later in exchange for cash now. The specific nature of 
the bank liabilities, whether retail deposits, saving accounts, secured or unsecured debt, is not 
critical at this point in the analysis. In Step 2, some random event, such as a sharp decline in 
asset values, has pushed the bank close to financial distress, but it has a contractual 
commitment to pay its liabilities; this cash outflow triggers financial distress. This financial 
distress, as a co-product, produces the public externality costs well-known to be associated 
with bank distress. 
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This contractual description provides the foundation for our approach. Using Coase’s 
theorem, the social welfare inefficiency associated with the production of a public externality 
can be mitigated by assigning clear ownership of the externality to one party. In Figure 1, the 
public cost externality is shown as inextricably tied to the contractual repayments of bank 
liabilities in near-distress circumstances. Does the bank own the right to sell event-contingent 
claims which include economy-wide negative externalities as a by-product? There is no hard 
and fast answer but one possible answer is that the bank does not – we assume that its 
banking license does not include this ownership right. Therefore throughout our analysis we 
assume that the public authorities own the right to control public externality costs associated 
with bank distress. This perspective affects our interpretation of government intervention 
policies and in some cases also has substantive impact on policy recommendations. 
Our Coasean perspective is not the only valid approach to bank resolution policy. An 
alternative is to define ownership rights in the conventional way, and allow for public interest 
over-ride of property rights to deal with externalities. Consider as an example this quote from 
a senior UK regulator, in discussing bondholder bail-in during bank resolution: 
 “Bail-in, like other resolution tools, involves some interference with property rights. But 
safeguards will apply which will ensure that no creditor is left worse off than they would have fared in 
a counterfactual insolvency. In keeping with that, it is important that bail-in follows the creditor 
hierarchy, secured claims are protected and netting arrangements are respected. And bail-in, like the 
other resolution tools, can only be used when it is necessary to do so in pursuit of clearly defined 
public interest objectives.” Andrew Gracie (2012) 
Our policy interpretation is different. We treat resolution actions not as an interference with 
property rights but rather as an exercise of Coasean-type property rights: the regulator owns 
Figure 1
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the right to prevent public externalities associated with bank distress. Any bank liability 
which has been sold to private claimants, promising payment in contingencies which may 
produce such externalities, is not a valid contract in this Coasean view. Such a contract has 
sold an event-contingent claim which the bank did not fully own (due to the attached 
externality) and so could not validly sell. This also invalidates the claim for compensation for 
resolution actions, since they are an exercise rather than an interference with property rights. 
This conclusion depends upon our Coasean assumptions – the assignment of ownership rights 
is not a given, it is a particular chosen assumption. So the approach suggested in the quote 
above is equally valid, but it is different from the one that we espouse for the Eurozone. 
In Coasean theory, after an agent is assigned ownership of an externality all agents jointly 
trade efficiently. A production-trade equilibrium which efficiently accommodates 
externalities is called a Coasean bargain. In our application, in which the externality comes 
from the link between bank cash flows and the public costs of distress, finding a Coasean 
bargain involves finding a cost-efficient set of bank contracts which block the contingent 
cash flow payments shown in Figure 1. We have assigned ownership of the externality to the 
public authority. In theory, banks could purchase back from the public authority the right to 
pay these contingent cash flows and generate the externality costs of bank distress. We only 
consider the corner-solution case in which banks do not purchase back the right to create 
economy-wide distress.   
Varian (1995) describes a simple model of production and exchange in an economy with a 
public externality and compares a Coasean solution, in which ownership of the externality is 
assigned to one agent and then agents bargain over its production, and a Pigouvian solution 
(see Pigou (1920, chapter 9)), in which the government imposes taxes on the externality to 
control its production. Varian shows an equivalence mapping between these two approaches 
to controlling the externality. In particular, given that the bargaining mechanism in the 
Coasean solution is efficient, and similarly for the taxation system in the Pigouvian solution, 
the two approaches both produce a Pareto-efficient production and exchange equilibrium, 
which differs only in its allocation of wealth across agents. Varian’s classic result is 
technically interesting, but not particularly relevant to our argument. Varian assumes no 
transactions cost, no information asymmetries, and no bargaining-related inefficiencies. In 
our application the Coasean approach is preferable to the more conventional Pigouvian 
approach due to the particular political-institutional-regulatory nature of bank resolution 
problems of the Eurozone.       
3. Bail-outs and Bail-ins in Bank Resolution  
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide a classic analysis of bank runs and the contribution of 
government bail-outs (or government-funded deposit insurance) as a resolution device. They 
consider a bank with lending assets which have low value if liquidated early at firesale prices 
and higher value if held to maturity. Bank liability claimants (in their simple model, 
depositors only) have the right to withdraw their claims at any time. In the absence of 
government-funded deposit insurance, the model has multiple equilibria: if depositors 
conjecture that all other depositors will withdraw early, sacrificing interest to protect their 
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principal value, then they also will withdraw early and the bank will be liquidated at firesale 
prices. If depositors conjecture that all others will not withdraw early, then the bank will 
survive. Suppose now instead that the government commits to bail out all depositors with fiat 
money – if there is a run by depositors, those who join the run will be redeemed in full with 
(possibly diluted-real-value) fiat money; those who wait will receive the same payment with 
interest. The government-funded insurance makes joining a bank run irrational irrespective of 
others’ behaviour and the bank-run equilibrium disappears. The insight in the Diamond-
Dybvig model is written into US bank resolution code - the FDIC has an explicit facility to 
request unlimited funds from the US Treasury (see Spong (2000, p.65)). The existence of this 
unlimited facility, paradoxically, eliminates the possibility that it will be called upon, and the 
FDIC insurance fund continually runs a modest surplus (see FDIC (1998, Appendix 3)). 
De Grauwe (2011) extends the Diamond-Dybvig model to the case of a currency union in 
which depositors have the ability to withdraw deposits from one member state’s banks and 
transfer cheaply to banks in other member states. In the event of a domestic run on banks, a 
member national government can provide a bank bail-out using sovereign borrowing but not 
using fiat money, which is centrally controlled. The pressure on sovereign credit quality from 
sovereign-funded bank bail-out expenditures can amplify the macroeconomic credit 
withdrawal shock of deposit flight, worsening rather than eliminating the bank-run bad 
equilibrium. The initial causality linking sovereign credit quality and domestic bank deposit 
flight can run in either direction.  So for example in the case of Ireland, deposit flight began 
in late 2008 when corporate and inter-bank depositors realized the dire state of Irish banks; 
this was followed by a very expensive sovereign-funded bank bail-out effectively 
bankrupting the sovereign, which induced even more deposit flight, a credit crunch, and a 
deep macroeconomic slump, and eventually the effective receivership of all domestic Irish 
banks and the sovereign under IMF-EU-ECB auspices. Conversely, in the case of Greece, the 
Greek domestic banking sector was run conservatively prior to its financial crisis, but it was 
revealed in mid-2009 that the national income accounts had been kept fraudulently and in fact 
the sovereign was more deeply in debt than realized. This led to massive deposit flight from 
its domestic banks, contributing to the ongoing deep recession, and ending with both 
sovereign and banking sector in deep insolvency. A similar sovereign – banking sector 
negative feedback mechanism is also evident in Spain and Portugal. In addition to the 
compelling case-by-case evidence of banking sector – sovereign feedback there is also 
evidence from bank and sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads. In a panel and time 
series analysis of weekly sovereign CDS spreads of eighteen European countries, including 
eleven Eurozone members, Dieckman and Plank (2012) show that the cross-section of 
sovereign CDS spreads is significantly related to country-specific growth in domestic 
banking assets over the pre-crisis period, and that the joint panel-time-series of CDS spreads 
depends significantly on the contemporaneous relative returns to a domestic financial 
services industry index. Acharya, Dreschler and Schnable (2011) build a theoretical model of 
interdependent banking-corporate-sovereign sectors in which the sovereign uses sovereign 
borrowing and tax proceeds from the corporate sector to bail out the banking sector, so that 
banks can lend efficiently to the corporate sector. They apply their model empirically to 
sovereign and individual-bank CDS spreads and provide compelling evidence of feedback 
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between domestic bank sector and sovereign bond credit quality in Western European 
countries.       
This interaction between bank bail-outs, sovereign creditworthiness, banking sector distress 
and lending, macroeconomic shocks, and cross-border deposit flight has made the Eurozone 
banking crisis more virulent than in the USA. The ongoing regional recession, destabilizing 
credit flows and joint sovereign-banking distress have been so severe that they have 
endangered the continued existence of the Euro currency. It is clear that sovereign-funded 
bank bail-outs are not an appropriate resolution mechanism for the Eurozone.  
An alternative to sovereign-funded bail-outs are bail-outs funded by pooled Eurozone-wide 
funds. However there are substantial difficulties with Eurozone-funded bail-outs of member 
states’ banks. Bail-outs of bank liability holders create moral hazard for bank owners and 
other bank claimants. They weaken the incentives for monitoring by non-equity claimants, 
and increase the incentives for risk-taking by managers and owners. In the case of a 
multinational resolution regime there is an additional level of moral hazard at the national 
level from bail-outs. It is now widely accepted that bank bail-outs other than explicit deposit 
insurance for retail accounts should be excluded from the bank resolution system. Best 
practice is to have in place deposit insurance for retail deposit balances below a maximum, 
and a no-bail-out provision for other bank claimants, and this is the likely future 
configuration in the Eurozone. 
A “bail-in” is any resolution mechanisms that forces debt holders to absorb losses. From our 
Coasean perspective it is key to distinguish between bail-ins that maintain the ex-ante 
contractual priority ordering of bank liabilities and those that do not.  Bail-ins which maintain 
the priority ordering of liabilities require bankruptcy, since equity has the lowest priority of 
all corporate liabilities. The problem with this type of bail-in is that bankruptcy works poorly 
as a resolution mechanism for banks. A key problem with standard bankruptcy is the cloud 
that impending bankruptcy puts on the bank’s ability to enter into reliable contractual 
relationships with liquidity and credit providers. For some individual sovereign states it is 
possible to envision a working bail-in system based on a very fast and efficient bankruptcy 
process, but this does not seem a feasible prospect for the entire seventeen-nation Eurozone. 
Bail-ins that alter the priority of claims, leaving the bank outside bankruptcy but forcing debt 
holders to accept losses, can be a necessary response to particular ex-post circumstances 
when better resolution mechanisms are not available. They can be justified when the 
sovereign is forced to bail out equity holders at a cost greater than the total value of multiple 
layers of debt, in order to keep the bank functioning outside bankruptcy and prevent the 
spread of economy-wide financial distress. The subordinate bondholder bail-in subsequent to 
the Irish bank bail-out of 2009-2010 is a prime example of a justified bail-in without 
bankruptcy. In early 2009, it became clear that several Irish domestic banks were deeply 
insolvent, with unaccounted-for losses greater than all their equity and subordinate debt 
liabilities combined. In order to keep its banking system functioning, and retain access to 
ECB liquidity support, the Irish sovereign bailed out Irish banks by injecting €60 billion of 
new equity. Subsequently, subordinate bondholders were forced to accept losses even though 
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the banks were never officially declared insolvent; existing shareholders suffered near-
complete dilution but did not formally relinquish their claims. Given the need for a quick 
response to the failed system in existence at the time, this ad hoc priority re-ordering was a 
justified action. However, this type of ad hoc bail-in with priority-reordering leads to 
ambiguity in contractual rights and is not a good foundation for future resolution policy.    
4. Prompt Corrective Action 
A different approach to the bank resolution problem has been implemented quite successfully 
in the USA, particularly following enabling legislation in 1991 which increased the 
regulator’s power over banks approaching financial distress. A policy known as prompt 
corrective action (PCA) is a regulatory system of fast, pre-emptive intervention into troubled 
banks by the regulatory authority, including extensive control over bank assets and 
management, as soon as impending bank distress becomes apparent.  
In the USA, the inability of the regulatory authorities to quickly and successfully resolve 
large US dealer banks was a central component of the 2007-2008 credit-liquidity crisis. (At 
the time of the US crisis, most of the institutions under threat did not have banking licenses 
and so were not within the direct purview of the PCA regulatory code.) The crisis spread 
widely and deeply into the US and global banking sector, impacting on all types of financial 
services firms, including non-dealer commercial banks. However, even during the height of 
that crisis, the US bank resolution system of prompt corrective action continued to work 
reasonably well for resolving distressed non-dealer US commercial banks.  During the 
troubled period January 2008 – August 2012, the FDIC resolved 454 troubled banks using 
PCA, and in only 5.2% of these resolution actions was there no buyer, i.e., bank closure. The 
USA has a large number of small banks, which partly accounts for the large number of 
resolutions, but not all of these distressed banks were small institutions. The list includes 
Washington Mutual Bank with accounting assets of $307 billion, for which the FDIC 
resolution action was completed in only 15 days.  
PCA is compared to bankruptcy in Figure 2.  Figure 2a shows a classic one-period payoff 
diagram for a corporation with a single debt issue with end of period payment of €100. If 
asset value falls below €100, firm ownership and management control passes to the 
bondholders, and the shareholders loses any claim to corporate assets. Above this value, 
bondholders receive €100 and shareholders retain1 ownership and management control over 
corporate assets. PCA is depicted in Figure 2b – if asset value declines to the region of 
financial distress then the regulator (in the US case, the FDIC) has the legal right and 
responsibility to oversee many aspects of management of the bank, promptly resolve balance 
sheet and/or management problems, and close, merge or re-open the bank according to the 
regulator’s own decision in the public interest. As part of PCA, the regulator has the right to 
force a critically undercapitalized bank into receivership. The resulting claim ambiguity is 
depicted by the wiggly lines in Figure 2b. The FDIC also has access to an unlimited supply of 
                                                     
1 Retaining ownership/control has no benefit to shareholders in this one-period model, but extending the model 
to multiple periods complicates the graphical treatment without aiding intuition. The graphs are merely 
descriptive. 
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US dollar funds to inject into a failing bank, if that is determined to be in the public interest. 
See Spong (2000, pp. 85-144) for an overview of PCA regulations in the USA. 
Figure 2: Bank Liability Payoffs Under Standard Bankruptcy and PCA 
 
Superficially, the policy of PCA can be perceived as an abrogation of shareholder and 
bondholder property rights, since ownership/control passes to an outside agent before 
bankruptcy. The ownership/control rights taken by the regulator in PCA exceed even those of 
shareholders in a standard setting, since the regulator has some authority to effectively re-
order or extinguish debt and equity claims in the public interest by forcing the bank into 
receivership, a power not given to shareholders or bank management. PCA sidesteps the slow 
working out of liabilities in bankruptcy by giving the regulator the legal right to pre-emptive 
control.  
It is useful to consider PCA from a Coasean perspective. Bank shareholders and bondholders 
have purchased the right to their bank claims, including managerial control of the firm 
(passing from shareholders to bondholders at bankruptcy). The key Coasean question: does 
that property right include the right to instigate a banking crisis impacting the wider 
economy? Put more dramatically, who owns the control right to instigate or prevent a 
banking crisis?  If bank liability holders do not own this right, then there is a justification for 
the regulator being given an explicit, pre-stated right to take over and run the bank in the 
public interest once the bank approaches financial distress. In this case, using Coase’s 
argument, it is efficient if shareholders and bondholders can only purchase contingent claims 
to ownership and control, contingent on the bank remaining out of financial distress. If the 
bank approaches financial distress, they have no (or explicitly limited) ownership and control 
rights. The state owns2 the right to prevent a banking crisis and PCA is the state exercising 
this property right. PCA is justified by this Coasean perspective. 
PCA embodies the Coasean principal that the regulator has a preemptive right over private 
contracts involving a bank if these contracts endanger bank distress and the associated public 
costs. However, PCA does this in a way that is not ideally suited to the Eurozone political-
economic and regulatory environment. PCA by its nature requires a rock-solid legal 
foundation. Legally establishing reliable and consistent property rights for PCA across all 
                                                     
2 Speaking strictly from a Coasean perspective, bank claimants should be freely permitted to purchase this right 
from the state, but it is likely to be prohibitively expensive. 
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seventeen independent nations of the Eurozone seems overly ambitious. The problem, which 
does not apply equally in the USA, is that Eurozone PCA relies on iron-clad authority for 
very fast regulatory intervention in any bank across a large collection of independent nations. 
PCA also relies heavily on a regulator who can successfully oversee troubled banks during 
the PCA engagement.  This requires a regulator with technical expertise, and fast, competent 
decision-making capability. The FDIC has shown that it is capable of making PCA work 
reasonably well (except possibly for the largest dealer banks3). It is unlikely that all of the 
individual national bank regulators across the Eurozone could be relied upon to enact PCA 
competently. The poor behaviour of some national financial regulators, e.g., the Irish 
financial regulator during the 2000 – 2007 period, shows how badly individual national 
regulators can perform in some circumstances. For any chance of success, PCA authority 
would need to be vested in a single cross-region regulator. Such a centralization of power in a 
multinational federation gives rise to its own challenges in terms of the ability to intervene 
quickly and aggressively in troubled banks. Consider, for example, the PCA intervention by 
the FDIC into eleven troubled banks in Nevada during the period 2008-2012; these eleven 
banks had a total of $316 billion of assets. The FDIC had to make quick decisions about the 
amount of resources to inject into these banks, impose changes in bank lending strategy, 
negotiate as to which of the banks should be promptly forced into acquisition by other banks 
(possibly headquartered outside the state), and which banks to close. These prompt decisions 
by the regulator might have long-term impact on the regional economy. State and regional 
political authorities in the US have almost no input into these important decisions. Consider 
now in contrast a hypothetical future event in which similar widespread bank distress 
impacted a region or nation-state in the Eurozone. Would the national political authorities 
allow a foreign-based regulator to promptly and aggressively take over their national or 
regional banking system and make key decisions about this industry, decisions which would 
also affect the long-term industrial structure and growth rate of the national or regional 
economy?  Would other Eurozone states concur if the regulator decided that the situation 
required a large capital injection from pooled resources? PCA might require a system of 
centralized political control which the Eurozone does not have and does not want. 
5. Contingent convertible bank liabilities 
An exciting and innovative approach to the bank resolution problem, first proposed by 
Flannery (2002), is contingent convertibility of bank debt. Figure 3 illustrates how this works. 
A trigger point tied to asset value (such as an equity/assets ratio) is established at or above the 
region of financial distress. When the ratio decreases to the trigger point, a proportion of debt 
is automatically converted, via a pre-existing contractual feature, into common equity at pre-
specified conversion terms. Figure 3 assumes that 50% of the debt is convertible and 50% 
nonconvertible. The trigger event transforms a proportion of the bank’s debt liability into 
common equity. The pre-existing shareholders and former bondholders then share equity 
                                                     
3 As mentioned above, at the time of the 2007-2008 US crisis many of the financial institutions at risk were 
outside the scope of the FDICs authority since they did not have banking licenses. Hence it is not clear whether 
PCA would work successfully for a large broker-dealer institution; its capability is untested for this task.  See 
Duffie (2010a) for a detailed analysis of the fast-paced distress and failure dynamics of large dealer banks. 
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ownership. If asset value subsequently rises, pushing the ratio above the trigger point, the 
conversion does not reverse. Unlike the management/ownership transfer associated with 
bankruptcy, share dilution via debt conversion is an external rather than internal corporate 
event. Management remains in place and continues to serve the needs of shareholders (the 
changing composition of shareholders need not impact on this objective). 
 
There are a number of trade-offs that need to be addressed in designing a contingent 
convertible debt regime:    
° The impact on credit growth and bank cost of capital from contingent 
convertibility of bank debt  
° How the scheme incentivizes or dis-incentivizes private monitoring of bank risk-
taking by shareholders and other bank liability claimants 
° The impact on bank management behaviour 
° The quality, timeliness and possible manipulation of accounting figures for use in 
trigger measures 
° The balance between triggering conversion too frequently or infrequently.  
Contingent convertibility of debt alters the incentives of shareholders and bondholders. By 
making bond payments contingent upon bank safety, contingent convertibility increases the 
bank monitoring incentives of bondholders relative to a system with an implicit bail-out for 
bondholders. This type of private-sector monitoring is a particularly valuable contribution in 
the Eurozone, where the quality of bank regulation is likely to vary across the region. 
Depending upon their features, contingent convertible bonds in the bank’s capital structure 
can increase or decrease the risk-taking incentives of shareholders. 
There have been a variety of specifications suggested for contingent convertible bonds. One 
design issue is the choice of the metric used to measure impending financial distress. 
Flannery (2009) argues (in the context of the US too-big-to-fail problem) that market-price-
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based triggers are superior to those using accounting ratios. Market prices capture newer 
information and are less subject to manipulation by bank management. Many of the banking 
institutions at risk in the Eurozone have illiquid or non-traded equity, so that the market 
prices of their shares are unreliable or non-existent. In the context of a strategic policy for the 
Eurozone, the use of market prices for trigger metrics is not feasible.   
Duffie (2010b) notes that in December 2008, after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy and 
during the depth of the US credit crisis, Citigroup reported an accounting equity-to-assets 
ratio of 11%, which is well above any hypothetical trigger value for contingent convertibility. 
Duffie points out that this mostly reflected the role of intangible assets particularly tax-loss 
carry-forwards, which boosted the book value of equity while readily available stockholder 
equity was actually dangerously low. He suggests that tangible equity-to-assets (which 
subtracts intangible assets from both sides of the balance sheet) is preferable as a trigger 
measure for contingent convertibility.  
McDonald (2011) considers the trade-off between having a conversion trigger which acts too 
readily, as a by-product distorting incentives and increasing the cost of debt capital, and a 
trigger which acts too slowly, potentially leading to economy-wide bank distress. In the 
context of the US too-big-to-fail problem he argues for a dual trigger, in which contingent 
convertibility is triggered only if both a firm-specific risk measure is exceeded (such as a 
minimum equity-to-assets ratio) and a market-wide measure tied to a banking sector equity 
index has dropped by a pre-specified amount. The particular dual-trigger suggested by 
McDonald has no relevance for the problems of the Eurozone – as a hypothetical example, 
the Portuguese banking sector could collapse in regional distress without having any notable 
impact on Eurozone-wide banking indices. It is not obvious how one could design a dual-
trigger system appropriate to the particular, and very different from the US, bank distress and 
resolution problems of the Eurozone.  
Another key design feature is the conversion ratio used for transforming debt claims into 
equity ownership after the trigger event. A dilutive conversion ratio gives bondholders a 
lower-value claim with conversion than without, whereas an anti-dilutive conversion ratio 
gives bondholders an increased-value claim, detracting from the claim of pre-existing 
shareholders. The conversion ratio affects the incentives of bondholders and shareholders to 
monitor and control bank risk, and the incentives to manipulate the conversion measure to 
hinder or encourage a trigger event. Sundaresan and Wang (2012) propose that the 
conversion ratio be set so that the trigger event is neutral in terms of dilution. Calomiris and 
Herring (2011) propose a strongly dilutive conversion ratio, in order to incentivize bank 
management and shareholders to avoid financial distress. Pennachi, Vermaelen and Wolff 
(2011) suggest a strongly dilutive conversion ratio combined with a call option feature 
allowing individual shareholders to repurchase the debt instruments, thereby avoiding the 
dilution of their equity ownership. This effectively transforms the contingent convertible 
bond into a combination of a contingently-callable bond and an equity rights offering.  See 
von Furstenberg (2011) for a review of contingent convertible design features. 
13 
 
The optimal design of contingent convertible securities requires a delicate balance between 
minimizing the impact on bank cost of capital, providing appropriate incentives to 
shareholders, bondholders and management, and providing adequate protection against bank 
distress. It is difficult to forecast exactly what long-term impact the various proposed security 
designs might have on banks’ overall cost of capital and on their continued, reliable access to 
funding. In the context of the Eurozone, one security design might not suit all circumstances 
across the member states. We suggest a flexible approach, in which individual banks working 
with their national regulators can choose the bond features they feel are most suitable, while 
the Eurozone regulator imposes minimal region-wide requirements. This allows for a 
competitive environment in which the best-performing security designs could be replicated 
and spread over time. Each bank’s chosen conversion features across bank claimants, chosen 
dilution ratios, and priority order of conversion across claims, could be flexibly allowed as 
long as the chosen features do not interfere with the potential conversion of the bank’s entire 
non-exempt cash flow liabilities into common equity. 
From a Eurozone perspective, two key advantages of contingent convertibility are legal 
clarity and regulatory simplicity. Relative to the contractual/legal difficulties of bail-ins and 
prompt corrective action, enforcing contingent convertibility is very straightforward. It 
requires Eurozone-level banking rules mandating that bank debt issues have clear and explicit 
convertibility features in their contracts at issuance. Importantly, at the date on which 
convertibility takes place, there is no uncertainty about the legal rights of all parties and no 
impact on the other contractual obligations of the bank.      
The Eurozone needs to eliminate “grey area” bank liabilities which are neither explicitly 
insured nor feasibly resolvable without bail-out or bankruptcy. All unsecured bank liabilities 
other than very short-term ones should either have explicit insurance coverage (such as retail 
deposits below a maximum account balance) or explicit contingent convertibility.  
6. Summary 
This policy note offers suggestions on bank resolution strategy for the Eurozone, taking 
account of the region’s unique political-economic and regulatory environment. The 
contractual, political and regulatory difficulties associated with bank resolution are daunting 
in the Eurozone. Due to the high risk of regional contagion the Eurozone requires a unified 
resolution system, but it is a federation of seventeen independent states with separate legal 
systems, limited fiscal co-responsibility, and varied levels of financial market development. 
Political legitimacy lies mostly at the national level, but bank resolution policy and 
implementation must be centralized.  
We argue that the bank resolution regime in the Eurozone should be built on Coasean 
principles – it should be made clear that, due to the public externalities associated with 
banking crises, the centralized bank regulatory authority owns the contingent right to prevent 
bank distress. Private contracts entered into by banks may not hinder this contingent right of 
the regional public authority. 
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We evaluate various approaches to bank resolution. Bail-ins which respect claim priorities 
are not a solution in the Eurozone since the bankruptcy system across seventeen nations will 
not have the speed and effectiveness necessary to very quickly resolve problem banks. Bail-
ins which do not respect claim priority create contractual ambiguity whereas the Eurozone 
needs clarity and simplicity. The reasonably successful US system of prompt corrective 
action (PCA) against distressed banks makes sense within our Coasean framework. However, 
PCA is not well suited to the Eurozone’s political-economic and regulatory environment. The 
Eurozone needs a banking crisis defence system with the strengths of PCA, in particular its 
early intervention feature and its embodiment of the regulator’s preemptive right over private 
contracts to prevent crises, without its weaknesses, in particular PCA’s difficult legal, 
political and managerial implementation.   
Contingent convertibility takes a different approach from bail-out, bail-in or PCA, one which 
is more compatible with the political-economic and regulatory environment in the Eurozone. 
It essentially replaces bail-in with “dilute-in”: bank debt must be issued with an explicit 
contractual feature mandating that the debt is converted to common equity when a specified 
risk measure breaches a trigger value. Contingent convertibility conforms well to our 
Coasean approach since these securities eliminate state-contingent cash outflows for those 
states of nature where debt payments might trigger bank distress. From our Coasean 
perspective, contingent convertible debt seems an efficient security design to block the public 
externality of bank distress in the Eurozone.   
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